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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY
Kellogg v. Travis'
(decided May 18, 2001)
Paul Kellogg was convicted in 1994 of assault in the
second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third
degree.2 He was sentenced to two and one third to seven years in
prison.3 After being paroled, but prior to the expiration of his
sentence, Kellogg was asked to provide a blood sample for New
York State's DNA data bank.4  Kellogg challenged the
applicability and raised constitutional issues regarding the 1999
Amendment to the 1994 Article 49-b New York Executive Law.5
His challenge was based upon the presumption that this
amendment was equivalent to an ex post facto law,6 violated the
double jeopardy7 provisions of the United States Constitution, and
posed an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment8 of
the United States Constitution, as well as the New York State
Constitution.9 The court held the law to be constitutional.10
Six months after Kellogg was paroled, his parole officer
notified him that he was required to submit a blood sample that
would be placed on file with the New York State DNA data bank."
' 188 Misc. 2d 164, 728 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Sup. Ct. New York County 2001).
2 Id. at 165, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
3 1d.
41d.
5 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995 (McKinney 1994 & Supp. 2002).
6 U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1 provides in pertinent part, "No state shall...
pass... ex post facto laws."
7 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part, "[Nlor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ......
8 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides in pertinent part, "The right of the people to
be secure... against unreasonable searches and seizures ... 
9 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12 provides in pertinent part, "The right of the people
to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures ......
1o Kellogg, 188 Misc. 2d at 169, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 649 (dismissing Kellogg's
challenge to the statute).
"Id. at 165, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
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He was informed that his refusal would constitute a violation of his
parole, which would result in his remand to prison. 12  Under
protest, he permitted the blood sample to be taken. 13 New York
Executive Law § 995, enacted in 1994, authorized the
Commissioner of the New York State Division of Criminal Justice
Services to establish a computerized state DNA identification
index. 14 Section 995-(7)I5 applied to certain designated offenders
of which Kellogg was a member. However, his conviction
occurred prior to the enactment of the statute, and therefore
Kellogg argued that § 995 did not apply to him.1 6 The 1999
Amendment to Article 49-B significantly expanded the reach of
the 1994 law to include not only those who committed their
offense prior to the effective date of the law but also those whose
sentences had not been completed at the amendment's enactment.
17
Kellogg argued that he had a vested right to be free of DNA
testing. 18
The court first addressed Kellogg's claim that this
amendment was an ex post facto law. The court relied on the
Supreme Court case of Weaver v. Graham9 to define the requisite
elements of an ex post facto law. In Weaver, the Supreme Court
reversed the Florida Supreme Court and set forth two critical
elements that must be present for a criminal or penal law to be
deemed ex post facto. First, "it must be retrospective, that is, it
must apply to events occurring before its enactment., 20 Second, "it
must disadvantage the offender affected by it.21 In Weaver, the
petitioner plead guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced
to fifteen years in prison.22 A Florida statute, repealing an earlier
12id
13 Id.
14 Id. at 166, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
15 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-(7), "[d]esignated offender" means a person
convicted of and sentenced for any one or more of the following felonies as
defined in the penal law (a): sections 120.05, 120.10, and 120.11 relating to
assault ... ."
16 Kellogg, 188 Misc. 2d at 166, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19450 U.S. 24 (1981).
2 0 Id. at 29.
21 id.
22 Id. at 25.
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statute, changed the formula for deducting "gain-time credits"
(time off for good behavior) from a prisoner's sentence.23 The
Supreme Court held this constituted an ex post facto law in that
petitioner's crime occurred before the statute's effective date and
therefore disadvantaged the petitioner.24  Drawing upon the
Weaver court's elements of an ex post facto law, the Kellogg court
found that while the amendment to Executive Law § 995 did
disadvantage Kellogg, it did not change the definition of any
criminal conduct, nor was it punitive in nature. 25 The intent of the
amendment was merely to expand the definition of persons who
must comply with the statute to enable law enforcement officials to
more accurately solve serious crimes.26 Thus, the court held the
27amendment was not an ex post facto law.
Kellogg next alleged that the 1999 amendment placed him
in a position of double jeopardy.28 The Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution prevents the state from prosecuting or
attempting to prosecute any person twice for the same crime.29 In
Illinois v. Vitale, ° the Supreme Court held the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy consisted of three guarantees:
"(1) It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal. [(2) It] protects against a second prosecution for the
same offense after conviction. [(3)] And it protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense.' In 1932, the Supreme Court
23 Id. Many states, including Florida, use of a statutory formula to reduce
prison time by rewarding each convicted prisoner for good conduct and
obedience to prison rules. In Weaver, this ex post facto law extended
petitioner's required prison time by over 2 years, approximately 14% of his
original 15-year sentence.
24Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36.
25 Kellogg, 188 Misc. 2d at 166-67, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
26 Id. at 167, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 647.27 id.
28 Id.
29 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 273 (1996) (citing Witte v. United
States, 515 U.S. 389, 396 (1995)).
30 447 U.S. 410 (1980). A juvenile received a traffic citation charging failing
to reduce speed to avoid an accident after the automobile he was driving struck
and killed two small children. After being convicted and sentenced to pay a fine
of $15, the State charged him with involuntary manslaughter. Id. at 411-13.
31 id. at 416.
2002
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decided Blockburger v. Unites States32 and set forth a test to
determine when two offenses are the same and are thus barred as
successive prosecutions. The Court stated that "[tihe applicable
rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation
of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.",
33
The guarantee at issue in Kellogg is highlighted by the court's third
prong, namely, multiple punishments for the same offense.
However, the Kellogg court summarily dismissed this claim
plainly stating, "[p]laintiff was neither prosecuted a second time
for the crimes for which he was convicted nor punished a second
time for those crimes. 34
The court allocated significant time to both the federal and
state constitutional issues raised by Kellogg pertaining to his right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.3 5 In Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Association36 the Court discussed, in-
depth, the Fourth Amendment analysis:
32 284 U.S. 299 (1932). In Blockburger, petitioner was convicted on three of
the five indicted charges for violating the provisions of the Harrison Narcotic
Act. The Court concluded that if the same-elements test (that is, whether each
offense contain an element not contained in the other) was applicable it would
bar prosecution under the double jeopardy provision. Here, the Court held that
although both sections of the Narcotic Act were violated, in fact, petitioner
committed two offenses. Id. at 304.
33 Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 416 (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304).
Furthermore, since the Blockburger test focused on the statutory elements of
each offense, the Court stated that if "each statute requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not, the offenses are not the same under the
Blockburger test." The Illinois Supreme Court found the two offenses to be the
same, but the Supreme Court remanded reluctant to accept their reasoning. Id.
at 421.
34 Kellogg, 188 Misc. 2d at 167, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 647.35 id.
3" 489 U.S. 602 (1989). The Federal Railroad Administration promulgated
regulations that mandated blood and urine tests of employees involved in certain
types of train accidents. Id. at 606. Further, regulations were adopted to allow
railroads to administer breath and urine tests to employees who violated certain
safety rules. Id. The question presented was whether these regulations violated
the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court held that the regulations were not
an undue infringement on the expectations of the employees' privacy since the
Government's compelling interests outweigh the privacy concerns. Id.
4
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Our precedents teach that where, as here, the
Government seeks to obtain physical evidence from
a person, the Fourth Amendment may be relevant at
several levels. The initial detention necessary to
procure the evidence may be a seizure of the person,
the detention amounts to a meaningful interference
with his freedom of movement. Obtaining and
examining the evidence may also be a search, if
doing so infringes an expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. We
have long recognized that a 'compelled intrusion
into the body for blood...' must be deemed a
Fourth Amendment search.37
The Skinner court continued its Fourth Amendment
analysis opining that the chemical analysis of the sample obtained
is a further ifivasion of privacy interests. 38 The court emphasized
the similarity between drawing blood, taking a breathalyzer test,
and testing urine samples.39 However, the Court stated, the Fourth
Amendment does not ban all searches, only those that are deemed
unreasonable. 40 The Court's determination of what is reasonable
depends upon the surrounding circumstances and the nature of the
search. 4' The permissibility of a search is based upon a balancing
of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests and the legitimate
interests. 2  In criminal cases, that balance isgovernmental in . I
supported pursuant to a judicial warrant for probable cause,43
except where special needs make the warrant and probable cause
37 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 617. The Court compared the physical intrusion, that is the
penetrating beneath the skin, of a blood sample to the production of a deep lung
breath required for a breathalyzer test. Both impose concerns about bodily
integrity and as such are deemed to be a search. The Court continues its
analysis that "there are few activities in our society more personal or private
than the passing of urine." Not only is it a function performed in private, but
also it is prohibited by law in public places. Similarly, it to must be considered a
search.40 Id. at 619.
41 id.
42 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
43..
2002 357
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requirement impracticable." An essential purpose of a warrant
requirement is the protection of privacy interests.45 A warrant,
limited in its objectives and scope, assures citizens that law
authorizes the intrusion. 6
Under the New York State Constitution, r Kellogg had the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures even as a
parolee. 8 In People v. Huntley,49 the New York Court of Appeals
agreed with the defendant that the acquired status of parolee did
not mean that one had surrendered one's constitutional rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 50 Although the court
did observe that what might be unreasonable to an individual not
on parole may be reasonable to one who is.5' In either instance,
whether an individual is on parole or not, the showing of probable
cause remains the general standard by which the reasonableness of
a search or seizure is to be measured.52 In Huntley, the defendant's
home was searched by his parole officer after a number of failures
to report. The search obtained evidence later used to convict the
defendant of criminal possession of dangerous drugs. 54 The New
York Court of Appeals, upholding the Appellate Division,
reasoned that the search and seizure was rationally and reasonably
related to the performance of the parole officer's duty, since a
parole officer's responsibility is to prevent violations of parole. 55
Concomitantly, Kellogg would have violated his parole by refusing
to comply with his parole officer's request for a blood sample.
The Kellogg court cited advances in technology and
remarked that the amended Executive Law did not require the
taking of a blood sample for DNA testing, but rather swabbing of
the inside of Kellogg's cheek would have been sufficient. 6
" Id.
45 Id. at 621-22.
46 Id. at 622.
47 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
48 Kellogg, 188 Misc. 2d at 167, 728 N.Y.S. at 647.
49 43 N.Y.2d 175, 371 N.E.2d 794 (1977).
5 0 Id. at 181, 371 N.E.2d at 797.
5' Id. at 180, 371 N.E.2d at 796 (emphasis added).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 179-80, 371 N.E.2d at 796.
54 Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d at 180, 371 N.E.2d at 796.
55 Id. at 181, 371 N.E.2d at 797.
5' Kellogg, 188 Misc. 2d at 167-68, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
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Nevertheless, they held the taking of Kellogg's blood was not
deemed, under the Fourth Amendment, to be an unreasonable
search and seizure because it was not taken to investigate Kellogg,
but rather to comply with the state's DNA identification index.57
Under New York General Construction Law §§ 9358 and
94,59 Kellogg argued that the original Executive Law Article 49-b
gave him the vested right to be free from DNA testing 6° and no
subsequent legislation could interfere with that right.6' Yet a
careful reading of Article 49-b confirms that Kellogg had no
affirmative rights under which either §§ 93 and 94 would apply.62
Rather, Article 49-b, as originally enacted, omitted Kellogg from
the class of designated offenders and there was no action or
proceeding commenced or pending. 63
In summary, in order for a law to be deemed ex post facto,
and thereby unconstitutional, it must retroactively apply and
disadvantage the offender by imposing greater punishment.6 It
need not
57 id. at 648, 371 N.E.2d at 648.58 N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 93 (McKinney 2001).
Effect of repealing statute upon existing rights: The repeal of a
statute or part thereof shall not affect or impair any act done,
offense committed or right accruing, accrued or acquired, or
liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred prior to the
time such repeal takes effect, but the same may be enjoyed,
asserted, enforced, prosecuted or inflicted, as fully and to the
same extent as if such repeal had not been effected.
59 N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 94 (McKinney 2001).
Effect of repealing statute upon pending actions and
proceedings: Unless otherwise specifically provided by law,
all actions and proceedings, civil or criminal, commenced
under or by virtue of any provision of a statute so repealed,
and pending immediately prior to the taking effect of such
repeal, may be prosecuted and defended to final effect in the
same manner as they might if such provisions were not so
repealed.
60 Kellogg, 188 Misc. 2d at 168, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
61 id.
62 id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Hock v. Singletary, 41 F.3d 1470, 1471 (11th Cir. 1995). Jeffery Hock,
serving a thirty-two year sentence for second degree murder, brought a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus alleging his rights were violated after a Florida
2002
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impair a 'vested right' . . . a violation may occur
when the law 'merely alters penal provisions
accorded by the grace of the legislature[.]
However, if a statute is merely procedural and does
not affect the quantum of punishment attached to
the crime, there is no ex post facto violation even
when the statute is applied retroactively.65
The ex post facto clause does not operate to protect one against
less punishment, but is rather a way to ensure that every citizen
receives warning of newly enacted criminal statutes and their
punishments.66
Similarly, genetic marker testing statutes have been enacted
in all fifty states and have withstood federal and state constitutional
challenges.67  Nationally, reviews of these statutes have
contemplated the unconstitutionality of genetic testing as a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 68 Courts have taken different
approaches in consideration of this issue:
First, some courts have applied a balancing
approach weighing both the convict's expectation of
privacy and the minimally intrusive nature of a
blood draw against the government's interest in
creating a genetic marker database to solve future
statute was enacted that rescinded provisional credits previously awarded. Id.
The District Court denied Hock's petition and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment. Id.
65 Id.
6 Id. at 1472 (emphasis added).
67 Gaines v. Nevada, 998 P.2d 166, 171 (2000). Gaines was on probation after
pleading guilty to a felony involving the unlawful use of coins in a gaming
machine. While on probation he was arrested for burglary and forgery and
entered into a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to one count of
burglary and one count of forgery and sentenced to seventy-two months and
thirty-four months respectively. Each of these sentences was to run concurrent
with the reinstated sentence of forty-eight months from the previous felony
charge. The District Court applied 217 days credit for time served on the first
felony, but would give no credit for the subsequent burglary and forgery
charges. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Furthermore, Gaines was
required by a Nevada statute to provide DNA for genetic market testing. Gaines
alleged the statute did not apply to him, as he was not a sexual offender. The
Nevada Supreme Court citing the plain language of the statute held that the
statute was not overbroad, was constitutional and applied to Gaines. Id.
m Id.
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crimes. Second, other courts have determined that
genetic marker testing falls within the "special
needs" doctrine that allows searches and seizures
without a warrant and without individualized
• • 69
suspicion.
Moreover, for a court to declare a state law requiring the
collection of a DNA sample as unconstitutional, a defendant would
have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the unconstitutionality of
the law. 70 The court in Kruger v. Erickson71 reasoned that "[t]he
Constitution only protects against 'intrusions that are not justified
in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper
manner."' 72  The Kruger court, citing Breithaupt v. Abrams,3
noted that blood tests have become routine in our everyday life.74
Thus, a blood test taken by a skilled technician "is not such
'conduct that shocks the conscience' ... nor such a method of
obtaining evidence that it offends a 'sense of justice."'' 75 Relying
on Supreme Court precedent, most courts have concluded that
drawing blood is "not an 'unduly extensive imposition' and that it
would not be considered offensive by even the most delicate. 76
Furthermore, it has been uniformly held that the government's
interest "outweighs a convict's diminished right for privacy in his
genetic markers because such information provides law
enforcement with a dramatic new tool that can be used to
69 Id.
70 Lighthouse Shores, Inc. v. Town of Islip, 41 N.Y.2d 7, 11, 359 N.E.2d 337,
341, 390 N.Y.S.2d 827, 830 (1976).
71 875 F. Supp. 583 (D. Minn. 1994). Petitioner, an inmate at the Minnesota
Correctional Facility at the time of the suit, was serving twenty years for
kidnapping. He filed a § 1983 action in state court claiming that his civil rights
were violated when prison officials ordered him to provide them with a blood
sample for DNA analysis in accordance with a Minnesota statute. After denial of
his § 1983 claim, petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in the district court.
This court held the statute was not an ex post facto law nor did it violate the
petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights and denied the writ of habeas corpus. Id.
72 Id. at 588.
73 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
74 Kruger, 875 F. Supp. at 587.
75 Id.
76 Gaines, 998 P.2d at 172-73.
2002
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accurately identify a criminal suspect attempting to conceal his
identity.
'
,
7 7
In Kellogg, the federal and state Fourth Amendment right
analysis focused on the same elements and ultimately advanced the
same proposition. This is not surprising since the United States
and New York constitutional provisions are identical. Moreover,
given that the legitimate governmental interest of assisting
investigation and prosecution of sex crimes is served by the
enactment of the New York statute, Kellogg's constitutional rights
were neither violated nor compromised. As Justice Kennedy said
in Skinner, "[a]s our precedent's indicate, not every governmental
interference with an individual's freedom of movement raises such
constitutional concerns that there is a seizure of the person.""8
Donna A. Napolitano
77 Id..at 173.
7 8 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618.
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 18 [2002], No. 2, Art. 22
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss2/22
